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2Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether the ability of market interest rates to predict future policy rate
changes in the United Kingdom has changed markedly over the period 1975-2003. Such
improvements in predictability could arise from greater transparency in the monetary policy
process, together with greater credibility of the Bank of England. Our empirical tests, using a
simple term structure model, show that predictability has indeed improved over the sample period
as a whole, and most markedly after the introduction of inﬂation targeting in 1992. But closer
inspection of the data reveals that predictability did not rise linearly, nor is it possible to generalise
this result across maturities. Furthermore, attempts to identify structural breakpoints in a formal
way were on the whole unsuccessful. Nonetheless, we conclude that, over the longer sample
period, the data show a clear improvement in the ability of market participants to predict policy
rate changes by the Bank of England.
Key words: Predictability of monetary policy, transparency, term structure of interest rates.
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E52, G12
3Summary
Monetary policy directly affects the shortest interest rates in the market. But if market participants
are forward looking, then their expectations of future policy actions - and hence future short-term
interest rates - will affect longer-term rates. This is a crucial aspect of the transmission of
monetary policy. If monetary policy is stable and well understood, then market participants might
be able to anticipate future policy decisions. Consequently, we would expect market interest rates
to contain information about future policy rate changes.
In this paper, we examine whether the ability of UK market interest rates to predict future policy
rate changes has changed markedly over the period 1975-2003. Such improvements in
predictability could arise from greater transparency in the monetary policy process, together with
greater credibility of the Bank of England. Greater transparency allows market participants to
anticipate future policy rate decisions with a greater degree of accuracy. Transparency can also
enhance the central bank’s credibility. Indeed, clear communication of its policy objectives and its
decision making process are likely to strenghten public conﬁdence in the central bank’s ability to
deliver its objective of stable inﬂation, thereby consolidating inﬂation expectations. Since
ﬁnancial market participants form views of future interest rate changes that reﬂect future expected
policy rate changes required to achieve this price stability, stable inﬂation expectations are likely
to contribute to policy rate predictability So this is another way in which transparency affects
predictability.
Empirically, we can test the degree to which market rates anticipate future policy rate changes by
examining the dynamic relationship between market and policy rate changes. In the United States,
researchers have found evidence of predictability at the shortest end of the yield curve, although
they also show that this predictability holds over very short horizons only. Recent work by Lange,
Sack and Whitesell (2003) and Swanson (2003) has revealed that predictability varies over time.
These studies show that since the mid 1990s, market rates have become better predictors of Fed
policy changes, and that the predictability horizon has lengthened. While the authors admit that
this shift cannot be attributed to a single factor, they cite the improved transparency of the Fed’s
monetary policy as a key factor in improving market participants’ ability to anticipate future
policy rate changes.
4In this paper, we conduct a similar analysis for UK rates in the period 1975-2003. During this
period, the monetary framework changed from (albeit not pure) monetary targeting (1975-1985) to
(various forms of) exchange rate targeting (1985-1992) and since 1992, inﬂation rate targeting. In
addition, monetary policy has become more transparent, with the introduction of scheduled
meetings to discuss policy rate changes (October 1992), the publication of the Inﬂation Report
(February 1993) the decision to publish the minutes of the monthly interest rate meetings (April
1994) and the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee (May 1997).
We start by estimating a simple term structure model and introduce exogenous breakpoints
corresponding to the key policy changes. The results of this analysis indicate that predictability
has improved over time, and most notably after the introduction of inﬂation targeting in October
1992. But closer inspection of the data reveals that predictability did not rise linearly, nor is it
possible to generalise this result across maturities. For example, at the longest horizon, it rose
brieﬂy after the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980 and plummeted after the suspension of
ERM membership in September 1992. Rolling regressions show that in the 1980s and early
1990s predictability ﬂuctuated between 0 and 60%, with frequent highs and lows seemingly
unrelated to any policy changes.
Finally, we formally test for the presence of structural breaks in the term structure model without
using any prior information on the location of potential breaks. This is done by employing the
recently developed methodology of Bai and Perron. Unfortunately, this exercise was on the whole
unsuccessful, as the tests did generally not identify the earlier-used exogenous breakpoints. We
attribute this result to either the unknown power properties of the Bai and Perron methodology,
and/or to misspeciﬁcation of the term structure model.
In spite of this mixed evidence, we nonetheless conclude that, over the longer sample period, the
data show a clear improvement in the ability of market participants to predict policy rate changes
by the Bank of England.
51 Introduction
Monetary policy directly affects the shortest interest rates in the market. But if market participants
are forward looking, then their expectations of future policy actions -and hence future short-term
interest rates- will affect longer-term rates. This is a crucial aspect of the transmission of monetary
policy. If monetary policy is stable and well understood, then market participants might be able to
anticipate future policy decisions. Consequently, we would expect market interest rates to contain
information about future policy rate changes.
Empirically, we can test the degree to which market rates anticipate future policy rate changes by
examining the dynamic relationship between market and policy rate changes. In the United States,
researchers have found evidence of predictability at the shortest end of the yield curve, although
they also show that this predictability holds over very short horizons only. Recent work by Lange
et al. (2003) and Swanson (2003) has revealed that predictability varies over time. Both studies
show that since the mid 1990s, market rates have become better predictors of Fed policy changes,
and that the predictability horizon has lengthened. In this paper, we conduct a similar analysis for
UK rates in the period 1975-2003. Given that our data set covers a long period, during which
monetary policy underwent signiﬁcant changes, we would not expect the relationship between
market and policy rates to stay the same over time. For this reason, we will be particularly
interested in the outcome of structural breakpoint tests.
Predictability of policy rate changes is not inconsistent with optimal monetary policy. In the next
section, we ﬁrst review the theory and describe the factors that can be expected to contribute to
predictability. Section 3 outlines the empirical model employed in the paper and section 4 surveys
the empirical literature on predictability of monetary policy. The data set is presented in section 5,
and empirical results are available in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Monetary policy and predictability
In most developed countries, central banks conduct their monetary policy either by targeting a
short-term market interest rate or by setting an ofﬁcial interest rate for their open market
operations. These policy rates anchor the entire term structure of interest rates. At very short
maturities, monetary policy directly affects market interest rates via normal arbitrage mechanisms.
6At longer maturities, monetary policy has a more indirect effect since market interest rates depend
on market participants’ expectations of future policy rate changes. This means that one can study
market interest rates and their ability to predict future policy rate changes. One can also assess
whether this predictability changes over time, when either markets or monetary policy have
undergone important changes.
One view of monetary policy is that if shocks arrive in a random fashion, the optimal policy
response is equally unanticipated, and policy rates will be unpredictable. Yet at the same time,
one frequently observes that central banks implement monetary policy via a succession of small
rate changes in the same direction (see e.g. Rudebusch (2002)). Hence, an alternative view is that
central banks adjust policy rates slowly towards their desired target. Empirical work on policy
rules further shows that this adjustment make take several quarters (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000)). This so-called monetary policy inertia is attributed to either central banks’s
preference for interest rate smoothing, or their slow response to new information.
But recent research in the United States and the United Kingdom has demonstrated that such
interest rate smoothing (also refered to as gradualism) might constitute an optimal response to
shocks hitting the economy if economic agents are forward-looking.(1) Woodford (1999) argues
that if a central bank has established a reputation for either keeping rates at the same level for an
extended period of time, or for implementing successive, small changes after an initial move, it
effectively has committed itself to a path of future short rates. Market participants will
incorporate these beliefs into their expectations of future short-term rates, and longer-term rates
will reﬂect the central bank’s expected future policy rate changes. In other words, Woodford
(1999) shows that it is optimal for the central bank to commit to inertia. This has two
implications. First, the central bank will be able to achieve its long-term objective (of e.g. price
stability) without excessive short-term interest rate volatility, and second, market interest rates will
contain information about future policy rates. Goodfriend (1998) refers to this as ’policy in the
pipeline,’ and argues that if the market correctly anticipates future policy decisions, then future
policy changes are reﬂected in market interest rates before being implemented by the central bank.
This is because market interest rates will not only reﬂect the ﬁrst policy rate change, but also the
sequence of expected future rate changes in the same direction.
(1) See for example Sack (1998b) and Sack (1998a).
7In the past decade, many central banks have taken steps towards greater transparency. These
initiatives have included the public communication of both policy goals (such as e.g. inﬂation
targets), and the central bank’s view on the economic outlook (e.g. though published forecasts and
minutes). Other aspects of transparency include the communication of voting procedures,
including individual votes. Winkler (2000) argues that besides openness (which relates to the
amount of information published), a transparent policy ought to be clear, honest and use a
language that can easily be shared. He further suggests that in the absence of a perfect, common
understanding, openness will not be sufﬁcient for transparency.
Greater transparency allows market participants to anticipate future policy rate decisions with a
greater degree of accuracy. In that sense, transparency leads to predictability. It is generally
accepted, however, that neither full transparency nor full predictability can be attained in a world
of uncertainty. While central banks prefer to avoid surprises (King (1997)), Vickers (1998)
acknowledges that monetary policy ‘cannot be absolutely transparent, nor totally boring’ as
monetary policy is a highly complex decision making process, particularly when decisions are
made collectively.
Transparency can also enhance the central bank’s credibility. Indeed, clear communication of its
policy objectives and its decision making process are likely to strenghten public conﬁdence in the
central bank’s ability to deliver its objective of stable inﬂation, thereby consolidating inﬂation
expectations. Since ﬁnancial market participants form views of future interest rate changes that
reﬂect future expected policy rate changes required to achieve this price stability, stable inﬂation
expectations are likely to contribute to policy rate predictability So this is another way in which
transparency affects predictability.
But increased predictability could also be the result of changes in the dynamic structure of the
economy. If shocks hitting the economy have become more persistent (or serially correlated) over
time, then the central bank’s response to these shocks is likely to have become more persistent as
well. This in turn would increase the predictability of policy rate changes, in much the same way
as our earlier discussion of gradualism outlined. Empirically, however, it is difﬁcult to distinguish
between gradualism and serial correlation, see Rudebusch (2002). Goodhart (1999), however,
suggests that the degree of gradualism in monetary policy is higher than the possible serial
correlation of shocks to the economy. Model simulations by Sack (1998a) indicate that the
8observed Fed policy cannot be explained by the dynamic behaviour of the economic shocks that
enters its policy function.(2) Martin (1999) and Martin and Salmon (1999) further show that
gradualism might also constitute an optimal response to economic shocks when central banks are
uncertain about key economic relationships. Since this uncertainty affects the economic models
central banks employ when considering their policy decisions, the research, initiated by Brainard
(1967), indicates that it might be optimal for policy rates to be changed in a smoother way than in
the certainty-case.
In the United Kingdom, the monetary policy framework has undergone important changes in the
past three decades. These changes, outlined below(3), are likely to have contributed to changes in
the central bank’s credibility and perceived commitment to its policy target. This in turn may
have affected the market’s understanding of the future course of monetary policy, and with it, the
predictive ability of market interest rates.
Between 1976 and 1985, the Bank of England conducted policy in a monetary targeting
framework. In July 1976, a target for broad money (£M3) was introduced as a response to the
1976 exchange rate crisis. But UK authorities continued to rely on a combination of direct
controls (prices, wages, credit) and ﬁscal policy in order to combat inﬂation. Direct credit
controls were abolished shortly after the abolition of exchange controls in autumn 1979. In spite
of frequently missing the £M3 monetary target, the UK government re-afﬁrmed its commitment to
a monetary target in the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in March 1980. As part of this
strategy, a monetary target range was set over a medium-term horizon (four years), and all other
macroeconomic policies were subordinated to the achievement of this target. Goodhart (1989b)
writes that ’the terms in which the Chancellor described his adherence to the £3M target implied
an unprecedented degree of commitment.’ Nonetheless, monetary policy continued to be
dominated by other policy considerations (e.g. concerns with a rising exchange rate after 1979 and
with domestic credit expansion in 1982-5) and ofﬁcial interests were raised sharply several times,
to reach a peak of 17% in November 1979. The introduction of additional targets in March 1982
further undermined the public’s conﬁdence in the monetary authorities’ commitment to monetary
targeting. The £M3 target was ofﬁcially abandoned in October 1985.
(2) Within the framework employed in the present paper, it is not possible to disentangle these factors, and neither
does Lange et al. (2003).
(3) For more detail, see Fforde (1983), Coleby (1983), Goodhart (1989a), Goodhart (1989b), Minford (1993) and
Nelson (2000).
9After the formal suspension of the £M3 target, and in light of the instability in foreign exchange
rate markets experienced during the early 1980s, monetary policy in the United Kingdom, as
elsewhere, was increasingly conducted with an eye on stabilising exchange rate movements.
Between 1987 and 1988, the pound remained within a fairly narrow range against the DM.
Thereafter, the United Kingdom continued to follow German monetary policy, until formally
joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1990. Nonetheless, a monetary
target for narrow money (M0) remained in place until 1992. Since leaving the ERM in September
1992, UK monetary policy has been conducted in an inﬂation targetting framework.
King (2002) argues that the introduction of an explicit target for inﬂation in 1992 led to a stable
and predictable policy environment, with inﬂation expectations ﬁrmly anchored around the target.
Subsequent institutional reforms further improved the transparency of the policy process. These
included not only the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee in 1997, but also the
introduction of scheduled meetings to discuss policy rate changes (October 1992), the publication
of the Inﬂation Report (February 1993) and the decision to publish the minutes of the monthly
interest rate meetings (April 1994). Since 1997, these minutes have included the MPC’s votes,
together with a range of views on the policy decision.
We conclude the present section by examining UK ofﬁcial rate changes. Chart 1 presents ofﬁcial
interest rates between 1975 and 2003 and shows that rate volatility was particularly high between
1975 and 1985. However, subsequent rate volatility did not decline substantially until late
1992.(4) A histogram of rate changes (Table A) conﬁrms that the early period saw many more
large policy rate changes than the later years. For example, out of 88 rate changes between
January 1975 and October 1985, 32 were of a magnitude of 100 basis points or larger. This
number fell to 12 between November 1985 and September 1992. After this date, there were only
three policy changes of 100 basis points, the last one in January 1993. The table further shows
that the range of policy rate moves changed after 1985, with rate changes being either 25 or 50
basis points (except for the earlier-mentioned 100 basis points following the ERM crisis). Prior to
that date, UK authorities used both ﬁner changes (12.5 and 25 basis points), as well as larger ones
(150, 200 and 300 basis points). Finally, Table A indicates that the frequency of rate reversals
declined over time. Speciﬁcally, they fell from 24 (out of 88 changes) in the period 1975-1985 to
12 (out of 41 changes) in the period 1985-1992. After September 1992, a total of 37 rate changes
(4) This histogram does not include the decision to raise the policy rate to 15% on 16 September, 1992, as it was
rescinded later in the day.
10were implemented, of which only 6 constituted a change in direction. This is consistent with the
increased gradualism in UK monetary policy discussed earlier.
To conclude, data on ofﬁcial rates suggest that the pattern of interest rate setting by the UK
authorities has changed over time. In the next section, we outline an empirical model that allows
us to quantify whether this has led to increased predictability in market interest rates.
3 Methodology
To explore whether the ability of ﬁnancial markets to predict future interest rates has changed over
time, we ﬁr s tn e e dt od e ﬁne how to extract expectations of future interest rates from market
interest rates and second decide on how to evaluate the performance of these expectations. That is
the purpose of sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
3.1 Extracting expectations from ﬁnancial markets
Various ﬁnancial markets embed market participants’ expectations of future interest rates. We
choose to focus on the Libor market because data span a long period, it is very liquid, and it is
dominated by major international banks so credit risk is relatively low. To extract market
expectations, we need a term structure model. The most commonly used is based on the
Expectations Hypothesis (EH).(5) In its simplest form, the EH states that the interest rate of a
long-dated bond (denoted by yn,t) equals the average of current and future expected short-term
rates (short term rate is denoted by ym,t) over the holding period of the long bond . To see how
this model is derived, we construct a simple example that compares two investment strategies from
day t to day t+1 in the bond market. The ﬁrst strategy consists of buying a one-day bond. This is a
safe strategy, with return given by y1,t.(6) In the second strategy, we buy an n-day bond today and
sell it at the beginning of tomorrow. In contrast to the ﬁrst strategy, this is an uncertain or risky
strategy because we don’t know its future cash ﬂow (the price of an (n-1)-day bond tomorrow




. In a risk-neutral setup,
the two investment strategies of our example yield the same expected returns. But, standard asset
(5) Although no longer at the frontier of term structure modeling, the expectations hypothesis remains one of the
most popular models for thinking about interest rate expectations by both policy makers (see e.g. Brooke, Cooper and
Scholtes (2000)) and academics (see e.g. Cochrane (2001)).
(6) We deﬁne the holding period return on an n-period bond purchased at time t and sold at time t + 1a srn,t+1.W e
use log returns, or in other words, we adopt continuous compounding.
11pricing theory augments the return on the one-day bond with a risk premium γ n,t, see eg.





= y1,t + ηn,t (1)
This risk or term premium compensates the investor for the risk associated with the riskier strategy
(which as said earlier has an unknown future pay-off). Equation (1) produces the log Expectations





= y1,t + ηn (2)








is an integer value (3)
where
s(n,m),t = yn,t − ym,t (4)














measures future changes in the short rate ym,t.
Equation (3) states that the spread between the n-period yield (yn,t) and the m-period yield (ym,t)
equals a weighted average of expected future changes in the short-term rate (ym,t) plus a constant
(γ n,m). It is easy to show that γ n,m is a linear combination of various risk premia if the log
Expectations Hypothesis holds(9). The intuition of this equation is that if the yield on the long
bond, yn,t is higher than the yield on the short period bond ym,t, short rates are expected to rise so
that the average short rate over the life of the long bond equals the initial long-bond yield. Since
the EH applies to any combination of long and short rates, we can take the policy rate as our short
rate (ym,t).(10) Equation (3) can then be used to examine whether the spread of a given market rate
over the ofﬁcial rate (c(n,m),t) has predictive power for future ofﬁcial rates (ym,t+i).
In the context of the United Kingdom, the ofﬁcial rate is approximately a two-week interest rate,








is an integer value (6)
(7) See eg. Campbell and Shiller (1991).
(8) Derivations are available upon request.
(9) see eg. Chapter 10 in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).
(10)By mixing Libor rates (unsecured lending) and policy rates (secured lending), we introduce an additional factor of
credit risk into the risk premium, γn,m, in equation (3). However, the effect of this distortion is likely to be minimal.
12where














γ n = γ n,14
Empirical work often rejects the log Expectations Hypothesis. There are various econometric and
economic explanations of this ﬁnding which will not be covered in detail here, see eg Bekaert,
Hodrick and Marshall (1997), Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Kozicki and Tinsley (2001). For
the purpose of this paper, the implicati o ni st h a tm a r k e te x p e c t a t i o n sc a nnot be extracted by




= sn,t − γ n, because this formulation of market expectations
is mis-speciﬁed. But how then are market expectations formed ?
A c c o r d i n gt o( C a m p b e l la n dS h i l l e r , 1991, p. 512-512) the risk-premium γ n in (6) is mis-speciﬁed
in the sense that it is not correlated with expected increases in the short rates. Similarly, Thornton
(2002) claims that the risk-premium γ n in (6) is mis-speciﬁed because it does not depend linearly
on the long rate yn,t. The essence of these explanations is that rejection of the log Expectations
Hypothesis is due to mis-speciﬁcation of the risk-premium because it is not speciﬁed as a linear
function of the yield spread sn,t, (Campbell and Shiller (1991)) or the long rate yn,t, (Thornton
(2002)).
These conjectures are consistent with a growing literature on yield curve modelling stressing the
importance of time-varying risk premia. In what follows, we adopt Campbell and Shiller (1991)’s
suggestion and modify equation (6) by redeﬁning the constant term γ n as an afﬁne function of the








is an integer value (9)
γ n,t = (αn + δnsn,t), δn > 0 (10)





= (1 − δn)sn,t − αn (11)
The interpretation of equation (11) is that market expectations of future changes in the short rate
can be expressed as an afﬁne function of the yield spread. ((Campbell and Shiller, 1991, p. 513))
refer to this model as an overreaction model of the yield spread. The log Expectations Hypothesis
is obtained as a special case where the population value of β is unity and therefore δn is zero
because the term premium must be time-invariant. Empirical estimates of equation (11) are
o b t a i n e db yr e g r e s s i n ga c t u a l changes in the short rate cn,t on the spread sn,t and a constant:
cn,t = βnsn,t − αn + un,t,
n
14
is an integer value (12)
βn = (1 − δn) (13)
So according to the model, estimates of market expectations are given by ﬁtted values,  cn,t,f r o m
the linear regression model in (12).
The error term un,t contains an expectation error, which will be uncorrelated with the yield spread
sn,t under the assumption of rational expectations. Furthermore, as can be seen from equation (12),
if the time span between adjacent data points is higher than n, the maturity of the long bond, then
the regression will involve overlapping errors, and un,t will be serially correlated (see Campbell
and Shiller (1991) and Hodrick (1992)).
3.2 Evaluation of market expectations
The former section explained how to extract estimates of market expectations. In this section, we
explore how to evaluate the performance of these expectations.
Ac o m m o na p p r o a c hi nf o r e c a s te v a l u a t i o ni st ou s eal o s sf u n c t i o nL(  cn,t,cn,t),w h i c hm u s t
obviously be a function of the expected value  cn,t and the outcome cn,t. By far the most common
loss function adopted in statisti c si saq u a d r a t i cl o s sf u n c t i o n
L(  cn,t,cn,t) = (  cn,t − cn,t)
2




(  cn,t − cn,t)2
T
In some cases, this quantity is expressed in term of the root-mean-square-error
RMSE =
  
(  cn,t − cn,t)2
T
Note that  cn,t − cn,t =   un,t, so the estimator of σun, the standard error of un,t,





is identical to the RMSE criterion. Hence, we adopt   σun as a goodness-of-ﬁt measure for the
market expectations  cn,t. Al o w  σun is associated with a low average loss.
An alternative performance measure is given by the coefﬁcient of determination R2 from the
regression in (12). It describes how large a fraction of the variation in cn,t is explained by cn,t.
Obviously, a high R2 indicates that the market is good at predicting future changes in the short rate
cn,t.
One could argue that the quadratic loss function used above does not provide a realistic
representation of market participants’ loss function. Alternatively, we adopt the linlin loss function
L
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used by Granger (1969). One motivation for this loss function is that it is asymmetric in losses, in
the sense that positive and negative forecast errors of the same magnitude do not give rise to equal




L∗(  cn,t,cn,t; a,b)
T
with parameters a and b. It is easy to show that the MLLcriterion is linear in (a,b), so without
loss of generality we normalize a = 1, and the criterion reduces to
MLLb =
 
L∗(  cn,t,cn,t; 1,b)
T
Al o wMLLb is associated with a low loss and thereby a high degree of predictability.(12)
(11)At least if a  = b.
(12)One could argue that in the presence of a linlin loss function, the conditional mean, which is going to be used as
the predictor of this paper (embodied in OLS regressions) is inadequate, as shown by Christoffersen and Diebold
(1997). Instead the quantile regression approach would be suitable because the underlying loss function is linlin.
However, we abstract from this interesting extension of the paper due to limitations of space.
154 Existing empirical evidence
Previous work on the predictability of short-term interest rates has tended to focus on the United
States. The earlier literature (see e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Rudebusch (1995))
concluded that only the short end of the Treasury yield curve contained information for future
policy rate decisions. Moreover, the predictability of short rates was found to improve with the
length of the forecast horizon. In contrast, at longer maturities, such predictability was found to
be largely absent.
More recent work has documented the time-varying nature of this short-term predictability. For
example, Lange et al. (2003) ﬁnd that throughout the 1980s, market interest rates had predictive
power for policy rate changes only one month ahead. But, from the late 1980s onwards,
predictability improved signiﬁcantly. In particular, from the mid 1990s onwards, market rates are
found to forecast up to 70% of policy changes several months ahead. While the authors admit that
this shift cannot be attributed to a single factor, they cite the improved transparency of the Fed’s
monetary policy(13) as a key factor in improving market participants’ ability to anticipate future
policy rate changes. Using a very similar methodology, Swanson (2003) ﬁnds that predictability
has deteriorated since January 2001. The author attributes this to increased variability in the Fed’s
policy rate, January 2001 being the start of its most recent easing cycle. For the past two decades
a saw h o l e ,t h et r e n dt o w a r d si m p r o v e df o r e c a s ta c c uracy is robust though, even after controlling
for policy rate variability and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Lange et al. (2003) also test the predictive ability of futures contracts, using the term structure
method described in the previous section. In particular, they examine federal funds futures,
which offer a payout based on the average federal funds rate over a particular month. In addition,
these contracts are used to construct a measure of the unexpected component of Fed policy
decisions. This ’policy surprise’ was ﬁrst introduced by Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Rasche and
Thornton (2002). The analysis by Lange et al. (2003) reveals that the predictive ability of futures
contracts has increased over time, with the federal funds contract explaining around 80% of the
change in actual policy rate changes from the mid 1990s onwards. This increase in predictive
ability is shown to coincide with a decline in the unanticipated component of monetary policy, as
measured by the policy surprise statistic.
(13)e.g the issue of a statement that includes the federal funds target after Febraury 1994.
16Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) conduct a similar analysis for the euro area. Policy surprises are
measured using principal component analysis for a range of short-term interest rates. They report
that more than 80% of ECB policy decisions between 1999 and 2002 had been anticipated by the
markets. Repeating this exercise for the United States (using the same sample period), they ﬁnd
that 73% of all FOMC policy decisions were anticipated.
Empirical evidence for the United Kingdom is relatively sparse. Haldane and Read (2000)
document the impact of policy rate changes on the UK forward yield curve between 1984 and
1997. They ﬁnd that about half of policy rate changes are anticipated at the short end. At the long
end, they document a greater degree of predictability. Finally, they report that predictability
increased after the introduction of the inﬂation target in October 1992, with the impact of surprises
changes falling to about 25% at the short end. Cross-country analysis for the period 1990-1997 by
the same authors reveals greater predictability of US and German monetary policy, and lower
predictability in Italy and the United Kingdom. The authors attribute this to differences in
credibility of the respective central banks and related, to differences in the stability of inﬂationary
expectations.
In a separate strand of the literature, Clare and Courtenay (2001) and Lasaosa (2003), examine the
reaction of market interest rates to both macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy
decisions. If monetary policy has become more transparent over time, then we would expect
market rates to react more to the former, and less to the latter. The event studies, using UK data for
the period 1994-1999 and 1994-2001, respectively, failed to conﬁrm this hypothesis.
5D a t a
Equation (12) forms the basis of our empirical work. We are focusing on the ability of the Libor
market to predict future values of the Bank of England’s 14-day repo rate.(14) Daily data for y14,t,
the Bank of England’s two-week repo rate and four Libor interest rates with maturities of one,
three, six and twelve months (n ={ 28,84,182,364}) were obtained from Datastream for the
(14)This approximates the average maturity at which counterparties borrow from the Bank of England in the open
market operations. Prior to 1997, open market operations were conducted via the outright sale of short-term bills at
the Bank of England’s base rate. While their maturity varied, the two-week rate is a good approximation for the
average transaction. Since 1997, the majority of operations are done at the two-week Bank of England repo rate, but
the option remains to sell very short-term bills ’outright’ to the Bank.
17period of 1 January 1975 - 26 March 2003.(15) Libor rates represent unsecured lending rates
among major international ﬁnancial organisations. Therefore they contain an element of credit
risk.
Three versions of equation (12) are adopted:
c28,t =   β28s28,t +  α28 +  u28,t (15)
c84,t =   β84s84,t +  α84 +  u84,t (16)
c182,t =   β182s182,t +  α182 +  u182,t (17)
c364,t =   β364s364,t +  α364 +  u364,t (18)
However, strictly speaking, we can not compute (s28,t,s84,t,s182,t,s364,t) because n in equation (7)
must be a multiple of 14 and our data set consists of daily observations on one-month,
three-month and one-year Libor rates (y30,t, y90,t, y180,t, y360,t). We therefore had to rely on the
following approximations of the spreads
s28,t ≈ y30,t − y14,t
s84,t ≈ y90,t − y14,t
s182,t ≈ y180,t − y14,t
s364,t ≈ y360,t − y14,t
As mentioned earlier, regression standard errors from equations (15)-(18) need to be corrected for
serial correlation in the expectation errors and we adopt the Newey West procedure, see Newey
and West (1987). These corrections, however, do not work well when the degree of serial
correlation is large relative to the sample size, see Hodrick (1992). Also, the breakpoint
methodology of section 6.4 does not seem to work well in the presence of serial correlation in the
error terms, see Bai and Perron (2001). For these reasons, we transform the data set of daily
(15)Datastream codes are: LCBBASE(IR), LDNIB1M(IR), LDNIB3M(IR), LDNIB6M(IR) and LDNIB1Y(IR). Data
for the six month Libor rate, LDNIB6M(IR), on 1 January 1975 is not available.
18observations into a data set of beginning-of-month observations.(16) In other words, equations
(15)-(18) are implemented by use of monthly data. In doing so, we reduce the amount of serial
correlation in the error terms un,t of (12) relative to using daily observations. However, under the
assumption of the model in equations (9) - (10), serial correlation remains in the residuals of
equations (16)-(18) in the form of moving average processes MA(2), MA(5) and MA(11),
respectively. Therefore, the Newey-West procedure mentioned above is implemented by assuming
that no serial correlation beyond lags 0, 2, 5, and 11 exist for equations (15)-(18) respectively, see
eg. Hodrick (1992).
Before implementing these regressions, it is worth having a preliminary look at the data. Chart 2
displays time series plots of the one-month variables (c28,t and s28,t). According to the model in
equations (9) - (10) s28,t and c28,t should move closely together. This seems to be the case in some
periods only and mostly after 1995. Charts 3, 4, and 5 display similar time series plot for the
three, six, and twelve-month variables (c84,t and s84,t, c182,t and s182,t, and c364,t and s364,t). In all
cases, the two variables appear to move closely together in the last third of the sample only.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Estimation of market expectations
Estimates of equations (15)-(18) with Newey-West standard errors in brackets are shown in Table
B. Note that the effective sample periods differ because of the construction of cn,t, see equation
(8).
According to the log Expectations Hypothesis βi should equal unity. However, the  βi’s in Table B,
except for   β182 differ signiﬁcantly from unity, rejecting the hypothesis at a 5 % signiﬁcance level.
This empirical rejection of the log Expectations Hypothesis is a well-documented result, and has
been ascribed to a number of factors. First, it is argued that if the risk premium is time-varying,
then equation (12) is not correctly speciﬁed. Campbell, Shiller and Schoenholtz (1983) suggest
that failure to incorporate this time variation into the regression equation could explain the
empirical rejection of the log Expectations Hypothesis. This is precisely the motivation for
accounting for a time-varying risk premium as reﬂected in the model described in section 3.1.
(16)Speciﬁcally, we pick data for the ﬁrst of each month. If this data point does not exist, eg because the day was in a
weekend, we pick data for the last business day of the preceding month.
19Second, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) provide an alternative explanation. They argue that the
empirical model given by equation (12) with βn = 1 could be rejected by the data even if the log
Expectations Hypothesis holds. Instead, the empirical rejection might reﬂect shifting expectations
about the long-term policy objectives of the central bank. In particular, they show that if market
participants have imperfect information about the central bank’s objectives and are slow in
updating their beliefs in the light of new information, then empirical rejection of equation (12) is
not necessarily evidence against the log Expectations Hypothesis, namely that long bond rates
reﬂect expected short rates.
Table B further shows that the estimates of αi’s are negative for i ={ 28,84,182} and positive for
i = 364. Note that αi’s can only be interpreted as a linear combination of risk premia, when
βi = 1 can not be rejected. Hence, the sign of  α182 is consistent with our priors.(17)
Finally, Table B shows that the R2 is quite small for i = 28, but increase to 15 − 20% at longer
maturities. Residual autocorrelations for equations (15)-(18) are displayed in Chart 12. It seems
fair to say that no serial correlation exists beyond lags 0, 2, 5, and 11 respectively for equations
(15)-(18).
The main question of this paper is whether the ability to predict changes in the Bank of England’s
two-week repo rate has changed over time. As said earlier, we employ two measures of evaluating
the quality of market expectations, σu and R2. Consequently, we will be looking for time
variation, in the form of discrete shifts, in these two measures.(18) The coefﬁcient of determination
, R2, is determined by α, β,a n dσu, so we will be looking for time variation in four distinct but
related parameters: R2,α ,β,a n dσu.
To examine such time variation, we carry out three sets of tests. First, we re-estimate equations
(15) - (18), but allow for a small number of exogenous shifts in (α,β) drawn from our earlier
discussion of monetary policy in the United Kingdom (section 6.2). Second, in section 6.3., we
explore time variation in predictability by visual tools in the form of rolling regressions. Finally,
in section 6.4, we formally test for structural breaks in equations (15) - (18) without using any
(17)We don’t have any priors on αi when   βi is statistically different from unity, so we only comment on the signs of
  αi when i = 182.
(18)Gradual as opposed to discrete shifts in the performance of market expectations might be a more realistic
assumption to make, based on the idea that eg. learning is a gradual process. However, we proceed with the
hypothesis of discrete shifts, mainly due to technical reasons.
20prior information on the location of potential breaks.
6.2 Estimation of market expectations with exogenous regime shifts
In this section, we re-estimate the market expectations from equations (15) - (18) by allowing for
structural breaks in the relationship between market expectations (yield spreads) and policy rates.
These breaks correspond to some of the earlier discussed changes in the monetary policy
framework. They include: the introduction of the MTFS (March 1980); the start of ERM
membership (October 1990); ERM exit and start of inﬂation targeting (October 1992) and Bank of
England independence (May 1997).
Table C below reports Chow test-statistics corresponding to these four breaks, testing for stability
jointly in the  αi and  βi parameters.(19) They reject the null hypothesis of no breaks for the one-
and twelve-month equations only. However, the null hypothesis will be rejected also for the
three-month equation at a signiﬁcance level of 10 %. Note that the Chow tests employed in Table
Cd on o tt e s tf o rb r e a k si nσ,and hence they may lack power against alternatives where such
breaks are taking place.
Table C further reports the estimation results for equations (15) - (18). A number of interesting
features stand out. First, in the case of the three-, six-, and twelve-month rates, the coefﬁcients of
determination, R2’s, increase over time, with the period after October 1992 showing a markedly
improved ﬁt. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd evidence of increased predictability from 1992 onwards,
whereas predictability appears to be at its lowest level between 1990 and 1992. For the
one-month rate, however, such a rise in predictability is seen only after May 1997.
Second, the root-mean-squared-error of the market forecasts, as embodied in   σu,d i s p l a y sa
decline over the period, with the lowest estimates observed since November 92. One could
conjecture that this result is driven by the fact that volatility of the target rate has declined over
time, see Table A and Chart 1. However the R2’s, measuring the fraction of the total variance of
changes in the short rate predicted by the yield spread, have increased as described above. In other
words, the predicted variance of the short rate as a fraction of the total variance has increased over
time. So the conjecture above seems to be rejected. The bottom line is that the declines in   σu,
(19)The variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is estimated by the Newey-West method as described in section
5.
21observed in Table C, are consistent with a rise in predictability since 1992.
Third, as a robustness check, predictability as measured by the mean linlin loss criterion is also
reported, see MLL0.75. The general picture is consistent with   σu and R2’s: predictability has
increased since 1992.(20)
Fourth, when estimating equations (15) - (18) for the earlier sub-periods, we obtain mixed results.
Before 1980, the ability of the market expectations to predict policy rate changes is markedly
lower than in the period after 1992 in the case of the three-, six-, and twelve-month rate, and after
1997 in the case of the one-month rate. After the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980, the
markets’ ability to predict policy rate changes increases at the twelve-month maturity, but falls at
the one-, three-, and six-month maturities. This is visible in both the  βi’s, the R2’s, and the   σu.
As an aside, we re-estimated the market expectations with an additional break, April 1994 (the
publication of minutes). While Chow tests conﬁrm this to be a signiﬁcant break, the regression
results, see Table D, show that including 1994 as a break point does not alter the conclusion that
the null of no breaks is rejected for all but equation (18) at a signiﬁcance level of 10%. In this
case, predictability (as evidenced by the   σ2
u and R2) does not rise until after 1994.
The results presented so far provide a ﬁrst indication that changes in the UK monetary policy
framework were associated with greater predictability in policy making. However, the regression
results are not entirely consistent with such a strong conclusion. Increased predictability is not
witnessed in all market rates. Moreover, the regression results ﬂuctuate from one sub-period to
another, and it is not clear that this is always an accurate reﬂection of monetary policy. Taken
together, these observations point to some of the shortcomings of the chosen method. First, when
imposing a small number of break points corresponding to policy changes, the researcher assumes
that the policy change in question is immediately incorporated into market expectations. If in
contrast, market participants take time to modify their views of central bank behavior, then we
would expect to see a gradual adjustment in the behavior of market rates. Regressions that rely on
a small number of discrete shifts would not be able to detect this. Second, our choice of four
break points was clearly subjective, and we are at risk of having missed other, potentially relevant
break dates. In the following two sections, we perform a more objective analysis in the sense that
(20)The choice of b = 0.75 is arbitrary, but the picture is the same for b = 0.5, and for b = 4
3 and b = 2.
22we disregard any prior information on potential break dates and let ”data speak for themselves”.
Finally, it is worth noting that the regressions of this section, as well as those of the following
sections, assume parameter stability within each sub-sample.
6.3 Estimation of market expectations based on rolling regressions
In this section, we estimate equations (15)-(18) over moving windows of four and eight years.(21)
Stable coefﬁcient estimates would be associated with no changes in the parameters. Chart 6
displays the results graphically for the four year window for the one-month rate in row 1, the
three-month rate in row 2, the six-month rate in row 3, and the twelve-month rate in the last
row.(22) Conﬁdence intervals (95 % signiﬁcance level) are depicted by dotted lines around the
parameter estimates.
For the one-month rate, both  α28 and  β28 look fairly stable and most of the time they are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Moving to the three-month, six-month and twelwe-month rates,
  αi’s and   βi’s look fairly unstable. The movements in these parameter estimates are closely related
in the sense that they seem to move together. When repeating this exercise with a moving window
of eight year (Chart 7), the various parameter estimates are less volatile due to a larger window
width but the general impression obtained from Chart 6 continues to hold.
At ﬁrst sight, Charts 6 and 7 suggest that equations (15)-(18) may be subject to structural changes.
In particular the  β coefﬁcients appear more variable during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. At a ﬁrst
sight, this seems to point to a structural break in the early 1990s, and would be consistent with the
results of the previous section. But, rolling regressions should only be considered as rough visual
tools to locate structural breaks. Rigorous identiﬁcation of structural breaks will be carried out in
section 6.4.
Turning to performance measures of market expectations, Chart 8 displays rolling estimates of the
residual standard error   σn with a moving window of four years. Chart 9 displays the same content
with a moving window of eight years. The general picture is very clear. Market expectations
measured by the RMSE declined gradually over the period, with the exception of 1980-1982 for
(21)Corresponding to windows of 49 and 89 observations.
(22)The time index of the parameter estimates denote the center of the moving window. E.g. the very ﬁrst  β28 in row
1 of Chart 6 corresponds to January 1977 and is estimated over the sample period of Jan 1975 to Jan 1979.
23the four year window.
Chart 10 displays R2’s from the regressions of Chart 6 with a moving window of four years of
observations, R2
28 referring to R2 from equation (15), R2
84 to R2 from equation (16), R2
182 to R2
from equation (17),and R2
364 to R2 from equation (18), respectively. The charts indicate substantial
variation over time in the R2’s, and they are noticeably higher from the mid 1990’s onwards. R2
28
ranges between 0 and 0.15 until 1997 where it spikes up and stays between 0.1a n d0 .3u n t i lt h e
end of the sample. R2
84 rises above 0.5 after 1995 , having been below 0.3 during most of the
preceding years, and even close to zero for prolonged periods of time. The plots of R2
182 and R2
364
are similar, reaching highs of 0.4 around 1985 and 0.6 around 1990. From 1995 onwards, the




which was also observed in Charts 6 and 8. For reference, Chart 11 displays rolling R2’s with the
larger moving window. The general picture stays the same. But once again, one has to be careful
in interpreting these plots in the sense that the evidence of structural breaks is based purely on
visual tools. Furthermore, in the absence of standard errors for the R2’ s ,i ti sh a r dt og a u g et h e
exact change in R2’s or whether the observed changes in predictability were statistically
signiﬁcant.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to compare the results obtained so far with those of Lange et al.
(2003). They carry out rolling regressions using three-month Treasury bill rates and report a
signiﬁcant increase in the R2’s in the late 1980s and a further rise in the early 1990s. R2’s rise
from around zero in the early 1980s to well above 0.7 in early 1994. The authors argue that these
rises seem to coincide with improvements in Federal Reserve policy transparency.
6.4 Estimation of market expectations based on the Bai-Perron methodology
In this section, we carry out a more rigorous analysis of time variation in predictability by
employing the methodology of Jushan Bai and Pierre Perron. The core theory is described Bai and
Perron (1998), numerical issues and software are described in Bai and Perron (2003a), a
simulation study with practical recommendations can be found in Bai and Perron (2001), and Bai
and Perron (2003b) provide additional critical values for the tests derived in Bai and Perron
(1998). The Bai and Perron methodology has recently been applied by Carlson, Craig and
Schwarz (2000) on M2 velocity and by Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) on equity valuation.
246.4.1 Breakpoint methodology
The modelling framework is a generalization of equation (12), allowing for breaks in the
parameters
cn,t = βn,jsn,t + αn,j + un,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj and T0 = 0,Tm+1 = T (19)
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks. So (βn,1,αn,1) correspond to the
parameters for the ﬁrst segment [0 : T1],( β n,2,αn,2) correspond to the parameters for the second
segment [T1 + 1:T2], etc. The aim of this section is to estimate {T1,T2,...,Tm} and the associated
parameters
(βn,j,αn,j) for j = 1,2,..,k
We have chosen the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998) primarily due to three unique features.
In particular, it allows for
• Multiple structural changes.
• General forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors.
• Different distributions for the errors and the regressors across segments.
Allowing for multiple structural changes is crucial because there are several potential break dates
over the sample period.(23) The reasons mentioned in the last two bullet points are important
because shifts in the ability to anticipate interest rate changes are likely to be associated with other
shifts in the parameters of the model, in particular the variance of the error term.
A detailed description of the methodology and its implementation is beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead we provide a brief introduction to the implementation of the tests.(24) Broadly
speaking, all tests consist of estimating equation (19) repeatedly with all combinations of
breakpoints {T1,T2,...,Tm} and choosing the set of breakpoints that minimise the sum of squared
residuals. There are three categories of tests, all using this same basic idea:
(23)See the discussion in section 2.
(24)Technical details of the analysis which would allow the reader to replicate our results are available upon request.
25• Test 1: Test of no break versus a ﬁxed number of breaks (l)
H0 :N ob r e a k s HA : l breaks, where l > 0
This test consist of estimating (19) repeatedly for m = 1 ...l. Doing so, one obtains a sequence
of F-statistics, which in turn are used to compute a summary test statistic: SupFT(l). The test
r e j e c t sf o rl a r g ev a l u e so fSupFT(l) and is derived in section 4.1 of Bai and Perron (1998).
Selection of l will be clariﬁed below.
• Test 2: Test of no structural break versus an unknown number of breaks bounded from
above by M.
H0 : No breaks HA : Number breaks between 1 and M.
A si nT e s t1 ,as e q u e n c eo fF - s t a t i s t i c sa r ecomputed and combinedi n t oas u m m a r yF - t e s t
statistic. In turn, these are put together, using some ﬁxed weights determined by the researcher.
Hence, the name ’double maximum.’ Following default settings in the software related to Bai
and Perron (2003a), we set M = 5.There are two versions of this test, the simple double
maximum test
UDmax
and a variant(25) denoted by
WDMax
They differ in the choice of weights. Computation of the WDMaxtest statistic depends on the
chosen signiﬁcance level, so WDMax(a%) denotes the test statistic associated with a
signiﬁcance level of a%. B o t ht e s t sr e j e c tf o rl a r g ev a l u e so fUDmax/WDMax(a%). For more
detailed information, the reader is referred to section 4.2 of Bai and Perron (1998).
• Test 3: Test of l breaks against the alternative of one additional break (l + 1)
H0 : l breaks HA : l + 1b r e a k s
To conduct this test, (19) is estimated sequentially for increasing l, with the summary test
statistic denoted by SupFT(l + 1|l). The test rejects for large values of SupFT(l + 1|l) and is
d e r i v e di ns e c t i o n4 . 3o fB a ia n dP e r r o n( 1 9 98). Clearly, Test 1 and Test 3 intersect for l = 0.
Having deﬁned the various statistical tests used to identify breakpoints, Tm in (19),w en o w
describe the actual implementation. The question is: how should we combine Tests 1, 2 and 3 to
estimate the number of breakpoints m and the associated locations {T1,T2,...,Tm} ?
(25)This test should have higher power compared to UDmaxin the presence of a large number of breaks.
26The recommended estimation strategy of Bai and Perron (1998), denoted by the sequential
procedure, is to start by setting l to a small number of breaks (typically zero). This procedure then
tests sequentially the null of l breaks versus the alternative hypothesis of l + 1 breaks by applying
SupFT(l + 1|l) (Test 3) sequentially from l = 0 (i.e. Test 1) until the test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of no additional breakpoints. However, in a simulation study,Bai and Perron (2001)
highlight a potential shortcoming of this procedure. In particular, in the presence of multiple
breaks, mechanical application of the above mentioned strategy may be sub-optimal in the sense
that the selected number of breaks tends to be too low.(26)
For this reason, Bai and Perron (2001) recommends an alternative procedure - in what follows
referred to as preferred procedure. This procedure is motivated by their simulation results that
show how it often is more difﬁcult to distinguish between no break and a single break than
between no break and multiple breaks, when in fact multiple breaks are present. Bearing this in
mind, the ﬁrst step of the preferred procedure consists of conducting the double maximum tests to
see if at least one break is present (Test 2). Bai and Perron (2001) show that in ﬁnite samples,
these tests have greater power than the test of no change versus a ﬁxed number of breaks (Test 1),
which is the ﬁrst step in the sequential procedure. If the double maximum tests indicate the
presence of at least one break, then one can apply SupFT(l + 1|l) (Test 3) sequentially from a
suitable choice of l, but avoiding l = 0. To determine l, Test 1 is employed, in the sense that the
ﬁrst signiﬁcant value of SupFT(1), SupFT(2), SupFT(3), SupFT(4), SupFT(5) determines l.(27)
We report the results of both procedures but attach most weight to the preferred procedure
following Bai and Perron (2001)’s recommendations. Computations are performed in GAUSS 5.0
by the software(28) of Pierre Perron.(29)
6.4.2 Breakpoint results
Tables E, F, G and H present empirical results for equations (15), (16), (17), (18), respectively.
The ﬁrst section of the tables, Speciﬁcation, deﬁnes the model. Note that Ti denotes the end point
(26)The reason being that if eg two breaks are present, the ﬁrst test in the sequential procedure FT(1|0) tends to
accept the null of no breaks.
(27)The selection of a suitable choice of l is not speciﬁed in Bai and Perron (2001), so the selection process outlined
above is our invention.
(28)Available at http://www.econ.queensu.ca/jae/2003-v18.1/bai-perron/
(29)We discovered a bug in the software, version 2.4 November 19 1999, in relation to estimating models with a ﬁxed
number of breaks (estimfix = 1). Corrected code can be obtained upon request.
27of segment i. Test statistics for the tests FT(l), UDmax/WDMax, and FT(l + 1|l) are displayed
in the second panel, named Tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% and 1% signiﬁcance
levels are denoted by ∗ and ∗∗, respectively. Number and location of breaks selected summarizes
the number and locations of breaks according to two estimation strategies: The sequential
procedure described above and the preferred procedure of Bai and Perron (2001). The ﬁnal panel
o ft h et a b l e sd i s p l a y st h ee s t i mated model selected by the preferred procedure. Standard errors in
brackets are provided below coefﬁcient estimates. R2
j denotes the coefﬁcient of determination for
the sub model corresponding to t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj. Estimates of breakpoints Ti are displayed in
the last row. Conﬁdence intervals with coverage probability of 95% are provided below.
For the one-month rate, Table E shows that the number of breaks is zero(30) according to the
sequential procedure.H o w e v e r ,t h epreferred procedure selects two(31) breaks: Jan 1980 and Mar
1984. The estimated β’s are insigniﬁcant, except for the ﬁrst segment, and R2’s are declining over
the period. In contrast, the   σ28,i’s are declining over the period, so the two measures of forecast
performance yield different results. Table F presents the results for the three-month rate. The
preferred procedure picks four(32) breakpoints: January 1980, March 1984, October 1989 and
December 1993. Predictability, as measured by R2 and   σ84,i, attains a maximum in the last sub
sample (Jan 1994-). The results for the six- and twelve-month rates in Tables G and H are similar
in the sense that both the sequential and the preferred procedure indicate no breakpoints.
Conﬁdence intervals for the breakpoints are wide in Tables E to H and typically cover several
years. In other words, the point estimates are associated with a large degree of uncertainty. When
allowing for these margins of errors, it might, however, be easier to see the economic relevance of
the estimated breakpoints. The ﬁrst breakpoint, January 1980, comes a few months before the
announcement of the MTFS. As explained earlier, the MTFS was at the time viewed as an critical
improvement on previous policies. The second break point, March 1984, is more difﬁcult to
explain, even when taking into account its conﬁdence interval (which is so wide in the case of the
three-month rate that it includes the ﬁrst breakpoint). October 1989 comes up as a third
breakpoint, but only in the three-month regression. That month saw one of the larger policy rate
(30)The idea of the sequential procedure is to test sequentially the null of n breaks vs the alternative hypothesis of
n + 1 breaks, starting from n = 0. So the ﬁrst test to consider is the test of zero breaks vs one break:
SupFT(1) = 8.99. It turns out that it does not reject the null of zero breaks.
(31)UDmax/WDmaxtests indicate the presence of at least one break. Hence, we jump to the ﬁrst signiﬁcant
SupFT(),w h i c hi sSupFT(2). Testing the null of two breaks vs three breaks by SupFT(3|2) does not reject the null.
(32)UDmax/WDmaxtests indicate the presence of at least one break. Hence, we jump to the ﬁrst signiﬁcant
SupFT(),w h i c hi sSupFT(4). Testing the null of four breaks vs ﬁve breaks by SupFT(5|4) does not reject the null.
28increases - 100 basis points coming on the heel ofas i m i l a rr a t er i s eb yt h eB u n d e s b a n k-b u ti ti s
unclear why this should produce a structural break in the expectations model (the United Kingdom
had been shadowing the DM since 1987), and why this shows up only in the three-month
regression. The ﬁnal breakpoint, December 1993, is present in the three-month equation only and
might (or might not) reﬂect the October 1992 change. It could also be related to increased
transparency about monetary policy decision making following the introduction of the Inﬂation
Report in February 1993. Unfortunately, the software failed to produce a conﬁdence interval in
this case due to numerical problems. Taken together, the evidence of Tables E to H indicates that
data alone does not contain sufﬁcient information to accurately identify breaks in the expectations
formation.
It is also interesting to note that on the whole, the data do not select the earlier-used exogenous
breakpoints. This could be interpreted in two, not necessarily competing ways. First, as
suggested in section 2, there may be multiple structural breaks in the regression equations. In this
case, the power properties of the Bai Perron methodology are unknown, because a maximum of
two breaks is considered in Bai and Perron (2001). The methodology may very well have low
power against the alternative of multiple breaks. Second, the simulation study by Bai and Perron
(2001), shows that serial correlation in the error term induces a loss of power in detecting breaks.
Combining this with the fact that the preferred procedure estimates 2, 4, 0 and 0 breakpoints,
respectively for equations (15) - (18), one could hypothesize that failure to detect breaks in the six-
and twelwe-month equations, (17) - (18), is due to the presence of strong residual autocorrelation
in these equations.
6.5 Speciﬁcation tests
The purpose of this section is to explore whether the models of interest rate expectations in
equations (15) - (18) are well speciﬁed, in the sense that the statistical restrictions implied by the
models are reﬂected in the data. In particular, we focus on two restrictions:
• Restriction on serial correlation of error term. Serial correlation is allowed up to lag orders of 0,
2, 5 and 11 for equations (15) - (18) respectively, see section 5.
• Zero coefﬁcients on lagged changes in the Bank of England two-week repo rate in the
regressions (15) - (18).
29Autocorrelation functions for equations (15) - (18) are displayed graphically in Chart 12. It seems
fair to say that the restriction on residual autocorrelation in the form of maximum lag orders of 0,
2, 5 and 11 is fulﬁlled.
The second restriction is a special case of the more general restriction that the spread st contains
a l lr e l e v a n ti n f o r m a t i o na b o u tm a r k e te x p e c t a t i o n s. Therefore any additional current (and lagged)
variables in (12) should be insigniﬁcant. A good candidate for a variable with potential
explanatory power in equation (12) is the change in the Bank of England’s two-week repo rate.
Chart 1 clearly indicates that changes in the policy rate are highly persistent in the sense that
increases/decreases tend to be followed by increases/decreases. Therefore, we estimate the
following regressions , allowing for changes in dynamics corresponding to the exogenous breaks






   






   






   






   
364,jbt−2 + w364,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,....,Tj (23)
bt = y14,t − y14,t−30 (24)
The purpose of this exercise is to explore whether lagged base rate changes has any explanatory
power for the variables c28,t, c84,t, c182,t and c364,t. If that is the case, bt provides a good candidate
for testing the speciﬁcations (15) - (18). The results (available upon request) indicate that
bt,bt−1,bt−2 do have explanatory power for c28,t, c84,t, c182,t and c364,t. In order to reduce the
number of estimated coefﬁcients, we estimate equations (15) - (18) with just current values of bt
as an additional variable, see upper section of Table I, for each of the segments identiﬁed in
section 6.2. The lower panel of this Table displays the results. Only  φ28,j appears to be
signiﬁcantly different from zero, so it seems plausible to conclude that the models of expectations
formation in equations (15) - (18) are well-speciﬁed.
307 Concluding remarks
Our prior when embarking on this project was that increased stability in policy rate setting (as
evidenced in Table A), together with increased transparency of monetary policy decision making
would have contributed to increased ability of market interest rates to predict future policy rate
changes. In particular, following recent US evidence, we were interested in identifying structural
breaks in the relationship between market and policy rates following key changes in the monetary
policy framework of the United Kingdom. Our evidence on such structural change has proved
very mixed.
First, we ﬁnd that in the context of a simple expectations model, exogenous breakpoints
corresponding to key policy changes are indeed signiﬁcant. Moreover, we ﬁnd that predictability
has improved over time, with the expectations model providing a decidedly better ﬁta f t e rt h e
introduction of inﬂation targeting in October1992.
But closer examination of the data reveals that things are not that clear-cut. First, when examining
different maturities, we see that the results do no always generalise. For example, predictability
from the shortest rates did not increase markedly until after May 1997. Second, our tests showed
that while predictability did indeed change over time, these changes were not necessarily
concentrated around the exogenous breakpoints suggested by the history of policy reforms.
Instead, predictability varied widely across the sample period and across maturities. For example,
at the longest horizon, it rose brieﬂy after the introduction of the MTFS in March 1980 and
plummeted after sterling’s exit from the ERM in October 1990. Rolling regressions show that in
the 1980s and early 1990s predictability ﬂuctuated between 0 and 60%, with frequent highs and
lows seemingly unrelated to any policy changes. Attempts to identify structural breakpoints in a
formal way were on the whole unsuccessful. Nonetheless, over the longer sample period
(1975-2003), the data show a clear improvement in the ability of market rates to anticipate policy
changes.
31Tables and charts
Table A: Policy rate changes (1975-2003)
Jan 75 - Oct 85 Nov 85 - Sep 92 Oct 92 - April 97 May 97 - Mar 03
Total number of changes 88 41 13 24
Number of rises 31 16 4 10
Number of cuts 57 25 9 14
Number of reversals 24 12 3 3




-0.5 40 21 1 4
-0.25 45 1 0
0.125 2







Table B: Estimates of equations (15)-(18) for the full sample.
  αi   βi R2 Sample period
i = 28 −0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03) 0.01 Jan 1975 - Mar 2003
i = 84 −0.10 (0.04) 0.52 (0.09) 0.16 Jan 1975 - Jan 2003
i = 182 −0.15 (0.09) 0.76 (0.12) 0.20 Feb 1975 - Oct 2002
i = 364 0.12 (0.06) 0.70 (0.10) 0.15 Jan 1975 - Apr 2002
32Table C: Chow tests of four breakpoints and associated parameter estimates
Chow tests of breakpoints at Mar80, Oct90, Oct 92, and May97
Equation (15) Equation (16) Equation (17) Equation (18)
Test statistic 1.98∗ 14.93 10.98 24.85∗∗
P-value 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.00
Associated parameter estimates
[Jan75-Mar80] [Apr80-Oct90] [Nov90-Oct92] [Nov92-May97] [Jun97-]
  α28,j 0.03 0.00 −0.07 −0.01 −0.01
  β28,j 0.15 −0.06 0.22 −0.06 0.27
R2
j 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.18
  σ28,j 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.08
MLL0.75 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.05
  α84,j 0.07 −0.18 −0.31 −0.06 −0.11
  β84,j 0.61 0.51 −0.15 0.60 0.67
R2
j 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.35 0.52
  σ84,j 0.75 0.66 0.34 0.18 0.15
MLL0.75 0.51 0.40 0.23 0.11 0.10
  α182,j 0.17 −0.20 −0.80 −0.13 −0.25
  β182,j 0.82 0.71 −0.05 0.80 0.96
R2
j 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.66
  σ182,j 1.27 0.97 0.63 0.23 0.24
MLL0.75 0.89 0.66 0.44 0.16 0.16
  α364,j 0.89 0.22 −1.28 −0.01 −0.34
  β364,j 0.28 0.90 −0.13 0.72 1.03
R2
j 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.64 0.61
  σ364,j 2.11 1.31 0.90 0.37 0.42
MLL0.75 1.46 0.92 0.65 0.27 0.28
33Table D: Chow tests of ﬁve breakpoints and associated parameter estimates
Chow tests of breakpoints at Mar80, Oct90, Oct 92, Apr94, and May97
Equation (15) Equation (16) Equation (17) Equation (18)
Test statistic 1.66 21.61∗ 11.57 26.92∗∗
P-value 0.09 0.02 0.31 0.00
Associated parameter estimates
[Jan75-Mar80] [Apr80-Oct90] [Nov90-Oct92] [Nov92-Apr94] [May94-May97] [Jun97-]
  α28,j 0.03 0.00 −0.07 −0.04 0.02 −0.01
  β28,j 0.15 −0.06 0.22 −0.15 0.03 0.27
R2
j 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.18
  σ28,j 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.08
MLL0.75 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05
  α84,j 0.07 −0.18 −0.31 −0.13 −0.04 −0.11
  β84,j 0.61 0.51 −0.15 0.30 0.59 0.67
R2
j 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.52
  σ84,j 0.75 0.66 0.34 0.25 0.13 0.15
MLL0.75 0.51 0.40 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.10
  α182,j 0.17 −0.21 −0.80 −0.11 −0.15 −0.24
  β182,j 0.82 0.71 −0.06 0.88 0.82 0.96
R2
j 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.71 0.66
  σ182,j 1.27 0.97 0.63 0.31 0.18 0.24
MLL0.75 0.89 0.66 0.44 0.20 0.13 0.16
  α364,j 0.89 0.22 −1.28 0.10 −0.04 −0.34
  β364,j 0.28 0.90 −0.13 0.96 0.73 1.03
R2
j 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.52 0.57 0.61
  σ364,j 2.11 1.31 0.90 0.36 0.37 0.42
MLL0.75 1.46 0.92 0.65 0.25 0.28 0.28
34Table E: Estimates of structural changes in equation (15).
Speciﬁcation
c28,t = β28,js28,t + α28,j + u28,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj T0 = 0a n dTm+1 = T
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks
Tests
SupFT(1) SupFT(2) SupFT(3) SupFT(4) SupFT(5)
8.99 16.83∗∗ 11.61∗∗ 9.20∗∗ 9.07∗∗
UDmax WDmax(5%) WDmax(1%)
16.83∗∗ 19.80(∗) 21.30(∗∗)
SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)
2.22 4.36 1.26 6.53
Number and location of breaks selected
Sequential procedure 0 {}
Preferred procedure 2 {Jan80, Mar84}
Parameter estimates with two breaks
  α28,1   α28,2   α28,3
0.04 −0.14∗∗ 0.00
(0.06)( 0.03)( 0.01)
  β28,1   β28,2   β28,3
0.17∗∗ 0.09 0.02
(0.06)( 0.07)( 0.20)







  T1   T2
Jan 1980 Mar 1984
[Jun 1979 : Aug 1985] [Apr 1983 : Oct 1985]
35Table F: Estimates of structural changes in equation (16).
Speciﬁcation
c84,t = β84,js84,t + α84,j + u84,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj T0 = 0a n dTm+1 = T
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks
Tests
SupFT(1) SupFT(2) SupFT(3) SupFT(4) SupFT(5)
1.75 6.05 6.98 34.27∗∗ 51.70∗∗
UDmax WDmax(5%) WDmax(1%)
51.70∗∗ 101.37(∗) 113.52(∗∗)
SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)
5.95 7.84 2.37 7.80
Number and location of breaks selected
Sequential procedure 0 {}
Preferred procedure 4 {Jan80, Mar84, Oct89, Dec93}
Parameter estimates with four breaks
  α84,1   α84,2   α84,3   α84,4   α84,5
0.09 −0.54∗ −0.03 −0.22∗∗ −0.08
(0.19)( 0.29)( 0.03)( 0.08)( 0.06)
  β84,1   β84,2   β84,3   β84,4   β84,5
0.67∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 1.15 0.11 0.66∗
(0.18)( 0.27)( 0.70)( 1.51)( 0.35)
  σ84,1   σ84,2   σ84,3   σ84,4   σ84,5







0.26 0.33 0.22 0.01 0.51
  T1   T2   T3   T4
Jan 1980 Mar 1984 Oct 1989 Dec 1993
[Jun 1978 : Oct 1985] [Mar 1980 : Aug 1984] Not available(33) Not available(34)
36Table G: Estimates of structural changes in equation (17).
Speciﬁcation
c128,t = β128,js128,t + α128,j + u128,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj T0 = 0a n dTm+1 = T
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks
Tests
SupFT(1) SupFT(2) SupFT(3) SupFT(4) SupFT(5)
1.38 4.98 4.45 3.28 3.88
UDmax WDmax(5%) WDmax(1%)
4.98 7.62 8.53
SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)
7.40 4.81 0.73 3.26
Number and location of breaks selected
Sequential procedure 0 {}
Preferred procedure 0 {}












37Table H: Estimates of structural changes in equation (18).
Speciﬁcation
c364,t = β364,js364,t + α364,j + u364,t for t = Tj−1 + 1,...,Tj T0 = 0a n dTm+1 = T
where T is the sample size and m is the number of breaks
Tests
SupFT(1) SupFT(2) SupFT(3) SupFT(4) SupFT(5)
0.38 4.41 3.66 2.83 2.53
UDmax WDmax(5%) WDmax(1%)
4.41 5.19 5.58
SupFT(2|1) SupFT(3|2) SupFT(4|3) SupFT(5|4)
1.24 0.91 0.91 1.36
Number and location of breaks selected
Sequential procedure 0 {}
Preferred procedure 0 {}












38Table I: Speciﬁcation tests of equations (15) - (18).
Speciﬁcation
c28,t =   β28,js28,t +  α28,j +  φ28,jbt +  u28,t
c84,t =   β84,js84,t +  α84,j +  φ84,jbt +  u84,t
c182,t =   β182,js182,t +  α182,j +  φ182,jbt +  u182,t




for t = Tj−1 + 1,....,Tj
Parameter estimates
[Jan75-Mar80] [Apr80-Oct90] [Nov90-Oct92] [Nov92-May97] [Jun97-]
  α28,j 0.02 0.00 −0.09 0.01 −0.01
  β28,j 0.13 −0.06 0.22 0.06 0.18
  φ28,j 0.07∗∗ −0.01 −0.06 0.14 0.18
  α84,j 0.08 −0.18 −0.25 −0.04 −0.09
  β84,j 0.60 0.51 −0.26 0.57 0.53
  φ84,j 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.28 0.32
  α182,j 0.17 −0.21 −0.74 −0.12 −0.25
  β182,j 0.80 0.71 −0.13 0.75 0.96
  φ182,j 0.06 −0.07 0.26 0.14 0.02
  α364,j 0.90 0.22 −1.29 −0.02 −0.40
  β364,j 0.33 0.89 −0.12 0.74 1.20
  φ364,j 0.19 −0.08 −0.07 −0.09 −0.68
In this table we focus on the signiﬁcance of the φ-coefﬁcients. The null of φ = 0 is tested for each φ-
coefﬁcient, and a rejection of this hypothesis at a one/ﬁve signiﬁcance level is denoted by **/*, respectively.
Standard errors are estimated by the Newey-West method allowing for serial correlation up to lag order 0, 2,
5, and 11 for the equations.















































































Chart 2: Time series plot of c28,t and s28,t.












40Chart 3: Time series plot of c84,t and s84,t.













Chart 4: Time series plot of c182,t and s182,t.










41Chart 5: Time series plot of c364,t and s364,t.








42Chart 6: Parameter estimates from rolling regressions of equations (15)-(18) with a window
length of four years.
Alpha28







































































Note: Time index of parameter estimates correspond to the center of the moving window.
Chart 7: Parameter estimates from rolling regressions of equations (15)-(18) with a window
length of eight years.
Alpha28



















































































Note: Time index of parameter estimates correspond to the center of the moving window.
43Chart 8: Sigmahat from rolling regressions of equations (15)-(18) with a window length of
four years.
Sigmahat28










































Note: Time index of parameter estimates correspond to the center of the moving window.
Chart 9: Sigmahat from rolling regressions of equations (15)-(18) with window length of
eight years.
Sigmahat28








































Note: Time index of parameter estimates correspond to the center of the moving window.
44Chart 10: R-squared from rolling regression of equations (15)-(18) with window length of
four years.
R-squared28









































Note: Time index of R2’s correspond to the center of the moving window.
Chart 11: R-squared from rolling regression of equations (15)-(18) with window length of
eight years.
R-squared28








































Note: Time index of R2’s correspond to the center of the moving window.
45Chart 12: Residual autocorrelation in equations (15) - (18).








































Note: Autocorrelations signiﬁcantly different from zero (using asymptotic standard errors) at a 5
%s i g n i ﬁcance level are shaded.
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